Capabilities are 256-bit secrets
Authentication tokens are persisted as hashes, access caps rotate, and refresh caps stay off normal read and write paths.
Capability systems fail sharply when secrets leak. The service is designed around that fact: high-entropy tokens, hashes at rest, short-lived access, header-first transport, and optional encryption before upload.
Authentication tokens are persisted as hashes, access caps rotate, and refresh caps stay off normal read and write paths.
Optional AES-256-GCM encryption keeps plaintext and the key client-side when its key-handling rules are followed.
The private trial has not had a paid third-party audit and carries no security certification or bounty programme.
The hosted service currently uses:
Important limits remain. Account keys are bearer credentials, passkey registration attestation is not validated, content is not scanned, the deployment is small, backup and restore are not guaranteed, and no control can protect a capability copied from an endpoint you do not control.
Send a concise report to svc@anphase.co.nz with:
If sensitive material is needed after triage, we will agree on an appropriate transfer method. Do not create an svc.nz box containing the vulnerability report unless specifically asked, because sharing the reporting capability would become part of the problem.
If you make a genuine effort to follow this policy, test only as necessary to demonstrate the issue, avoid harm, stop when you encounter another person’s data, and report promptly, Anphase Ltd will treat the work as authorised security research and does not intend to initiate legal action solely because of an accidental, good-faith policy violation.
This statement does not authorise breaches of other people’s systems, does not waive third-party rights, and cannot bind law enforcement or another organisation. Deliberate harm, extortion, privacy invasion, persistence after a stop request, or use of a vulnerability for personal gain is not good-faith research.
When testing:
Ask before doing anything that might fall outside these boundaries. A lack of immediate response does not expand authorisation.
In scope are the hosted svc.nz web and API surfaces, the official browser tools and downloadable svcbox client when obtained from svc.nz, and security failures in capability scope, rotation, expiry, second factors, encryption transport, CORS, static isolation, quotas, or origin protection.
Especially useful findings include unauthorised cross-box access, capability disclosure, authentication bypass, persistent cross-site scripting, request smuggling with security impact, path traversal, server-side request forgery, remote code execution, origin bypass, or cryptographic misuse with a practical exploit.
Generally not eligible for priority are missing best-practice headers without an exploit, self-XSS, rate-limit observations without a demonstrated bypass, clickjacking already blocked by headers, leaked credentials from systems not controlled by Anphase Ltd, hypothetical attacks without a practical path, or findings that require the victim to disclose a capability intentionally.
This is a single-operator private trial. There is no guaranteed acknowledgement or remediation deadline and no paid bug bounty. We will nevertheless try to acknowledge credible reports, reproduce the issue, assess severity, keep the reporter informed at sensible milestones, and say when the issue is resolved or accepted as a known risk.
We may ask you to pause testing, narrow a proof, delete data, or delay disclosure while a fix is prepared. Reports are prioritised by demonstrated impact, exploitability, affected users, and whether credentials or content are currently exposed.
Please give us a reasonable opportunity to investigate and fix a confirmed vulnerability before publishing technical details. We will not ask for indefinite silence. A disclosure date should reflect severity, active exploitation, fix complexity, and risk to users.
We are happy to credit useful reports if you want credit. We will not publish your identity or report details without permission unless required by law. Do not disclose live secrets, personal information, or details that would make an unresolved vulnerability easier to exploit.
Keep refresh capabilities offline where practical. Send access capabilities in the Authorization header, adopt cap_next, use narrow or time-limited caps for sharing, rotate on exposure, and keep encryption keys separate from capabilities and ciphertext. Clear the console’s local storage after using a shared browser.
Report content misuse through the Abuse Process. If you believe your capability leaked, invalidate or delete access first if you can, then contact us without placing the secret in email.